This story first appeared in Arab News PK

Former PM Imran Khan’s claim earlier this month that his policy for settling Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters and families in northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province was torpedoed by the provinces’ refusal to accept his government’s cost-sharing proposal, raises an important question: Was the arrival of armed TTP fighters from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s bordering areas part of the former government’s policy towards the TTP?

In its most comprehensive National Security Committee meeting held last week, which lasted over two days and almost eight hours, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government announced its policy decision to tackle the resurgent terrorist threat. It was decided that there would be no dialogue with terrorists, that the government would do all things required to enforce the writ of the state and secure its borders.

In many ways, the announcement is nothing new. Just a repeat of decisions made by successive governments over the last couple of decades. After all, the problem is not new either. Terrorism in Pakistan is no less than four decades old, beginning in the 1980’s, emanating from different tanzeems (organizations) and lashkars (armies), often initially mentored by the state and then becoming a proverbial Frankenstein monster. Pakistan has typically responded to the threat by engaging and fighting them.

And so did the last government. It opted to engage the TTP whose negotiating demand included reversing Pakistan’s constitutional move of integrating the country’s tribal areas into KPK province, the enforcement of Sharia law, pulling the Pakistan army out of tribal areas and the release of TTP prisoners.

Some prisoners were released. Like all previous governments, the PTI government also seemed to have been led by security agencies on its counter-terrorism policy. The PTI sought the support of the Afghan Taliban, a policy approved by the Imran Khan government and implemented by the country’s prime intelligence agency and subsequently, by the Peshawar corps commander. This involved talks with the TTP, and support from the Afghan Taliban to ensure a guarantee that Afghan territory would not be used to attack Pakistan, as well as allowing for the return of unarmed TTP groups with their families.

According to policymakers and policy implementers, the government had decided to take action against the TTP fighters involved in killing Pakistanis. Whatever the plan, such a policy was not implemented but armed TTP fighters entered Pakistan’s northern areas including Swat and North Waziristan.

Like all previous governments, in the absence of an informed, rigorous and comprehensive policy dialogue on the TTP threat, the PTI government’s policy ended up not delivering on planned outcomes. TTP fighters were targeted, made to surrender, disarmed and where possible, returned and resettled with their families in Pakistan.

In recent months however, multiple factors, national, regional and global have created a new context unleashing a dynamic that militates against the primacy of engaging with violent interlocutors that threaten, attack, or destroy law enforcement agencies of the state and demand the surrender of state authority in certain areas. Of the multiple factors that create the new context, seven are of particular importance.

One, the clear missteps and failures of the last dialogue policy cleared by the former prime minister and implemented by the military and intel top command resulted in the entry of hundreds of armed TTP men into Pakistan’s main cities.

Two, the arrival of armed TTP fighters in the densely populated towns of KP and Balochistan, extending into the capital Islamabad. September onwards thousands of local people rose up in opposition to what was seen as government policy allowing TTP fighters to return as part of negotiations.

Three, widespread terrorist attacks persist across Pakistan and continue to target policemen, counter-terrorism department (CTD)officials, soldiers, intel operatives, polio workers and local people.

Four, the people’s uprisings against the presence of TTP fighters since September, in areas bordering Afghanistan, have persisted. Mindful of TTP-instigated violence in the name of religion and the state’s confused policy towards the militant group, thousands have protested in KP and Waziristan.

Five, the November change in Pakistan’s top military command has prompted a policy review of Pakistan’s policy towards the TTP. From the last National Security Committee’s meeting the message was clear—some changes to the existing TTP policy will be made.

Six, there is a regional consensus among all countries bordering Afghanistan that no talks will be held with any Afghanistan-based terrorist groups. At several meetings, the special envoys on Afghanistan of most neighboring countries have declined the Taliban’s suggestions and offers that they could facilitate talks with representatives of Afghanistan-based terror groups.

Seven, the global acknowledgment that Pakistan is under terrorist attack from Afghanistan-based TTP fighters. The UN Security Council Monitoring team on Afghanistan in its May 2022 report acknowledged that Afghanistan-based “several thousand” TTP fighters have conducted “cross-border” attacks. The US administration too has acknowledged the threat Pakistan faces.

Against the backdrop of these, elements now primarily include enhanced intel and policing operations. No major military operation is required since the TTP does not control territory.

In a renewed effort to counter the TTP’s ideological thrust to use Islam to recruit locals in its ranks, popular religious figures have issued ‘fatwas’ reiterating Islamic teachings against terrorism. Their collective message is that only the head of a government can declare legitimate jihad, not non-state groups.

This policy direction notwithstanding, Pakistan faces two contextual challenges in tackling the TTP threat. One, to ensure continuity of a shared approach and institutional coordination within Pakistan’s civil-military institutions. Without this, Pakistan will find it almost impossible to effectively tackle the TTP threat – as experienced in the past with acute policy disconnect between civil-military institutions. Two, to ensure that TTP is denied the external sanctuary and support system within Afghanistan and beyond.

Like all previous policies, Pakistan’s new TTP policy will not easily yield success. But it is one that must be implemented holistically and consistently.

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This story first appeared in Arab News

Pakistani foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto’s biting words to his Indian counterpart on the sidelines of a UN meeting in New York last week came when he was asked to respond to India’s repeated labelling of Pakistan as “the host of Osama bin Laden” and the “perpetrator of terrorism.”

Pakistan’s top envoy replied: “Osama Bin Laden is dead but the butcher of Gujrat is still alive… and he is the Prime Minister of India.”

For BJP supporters in India, this was painful plain-speak. On a global forum, Bhutto had spoken the unbearable truth about Narendra Modi. His words sparked nationwide protests in India, and are still echoing across the subcontinent.

The harsh exchange was rooted in facts. The Indian press courageously and widely reported the butchering of sections of Muslims in parts of Gujrat with Modi’s silent approval or benign neglect in 2002. It led to Modi being banned from entering the US. Subsequently, climbing to power ‘cleansed’ him abroad and at home. Indian courts cleared Modi’s partners in crime who patronized rapists targeting Muslim women in Gujrat. It was the Modi re-election that prompted this domestic cleansing.

But last week, in a war of words, Bhutto reminded the UN press corps that PM Modi had the blood of Indian Muslims and Kashmiris on his hands too.

Pakistan’s young foreign minister was reflecting a harsh reality; one that other cabinet members had stated while presenting the dossier documenting the Indian state’s involvement in last year’s terrorist attack in Lahore. India was playing the ugly terrorism game by both conducting terrorism against Pakistan and by propagating Pakistan as the one conducting terrorism against India, recalled Minister of State for foreign affairs Hina Rabbani Khar. She acknowledged the unique challenge of Pakistan alone dealing with a terrorism-fanning Modi’s India. What Khar had recalled diplomatically, her minister recalled bluntly.

Given the usually mild-worded Pakistani criticism of Indian policies on terrorism, Kashmir, Pakistan and Hindutva, Bhutto’s words were a stark departure from the past. After his grandfather Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s scathing criticism of India’s Kashmir policies in the 60’s, it was Imran Khan whose plain speak on Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), RSS and the fascist ideology irked the Indian government enough to have a western diplomat approach a senior general requesting him to ask the then Prime Minister to refrain from labelling his Indian counterpart a fascist.

By the end of 2020, Khan had cleared Pak-India back channel talks suggested by security stakeholders. His ministers in the Economic Coordination Committee had cleared the import of cotton and sugar from India in March 2021, while the cabinet shot it down within 48 hours.

Pakistan’s India policy has wavered. Overall, Pakistan continues its multiple track policy. Four are important; one is the bilateral level engagement in accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty arrangement; two is the interaction and information exchange with Indian counterparts on nuclear facilities and the LOC situation since the March 2021 cease-fire agreement; three is the limited engagement as a SAARC member on matters ranging from climate change to pandemic threats and four, the engagements in multilateral forums including SCO, ASEAN, on military to economic matters.

Nevertheless, the absence of a comprehensive well thought-out India policy has meant ad hoc or fragmented initiatives or responses. They have ranged from opening Kartarpur corridor to the global broadcast of Indian terrorist Kulbashan Yadav’s attacks in Pakistan, to considering import of Indian products, to refusing bilateral dialogue on substantive issues. In recent months, PM Shehbaz Sharif has expressed Pakistan’s willingness to begin dialogue if Kashmir is also discussed.

And the latest: Pakistani foreign minister’s blunt calling out of the Indian PM in New York. For all the protestations against his harsh comments, Bhutto refused to retract his statements.

“I was referring to a historical reality. The remarks I used were not my own..I did not invent the term ‘Butcher of Gujarat’ for Mr. Modi,” he said in his Dec. 20 interview with Bloomberg.

Bhutto’s words were not a substantive departure from Pakistan’s general orientation of the India policy. It’s his blunt statement of facts bereft of all diplomatic niceties that has shocked many Indians. Its sharp impact will be blunted in the coming days but the challenge of Pakistan’s India and Kashmir policy will persist. Despite the many dimensions of Pakistan’s interaction with India, a future path of substantive engagement and cooperation seems missing.

Bhutto’s bold words notwithstanding, Pakistan must formulate a comprehensive and coherent India and Kashmir policy. It will have to be a policy that factors in Pakistan’s commitment to solving the Kashmir question, not ignoring it.

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Exclusive talk with Asad Umar | Nasim Zehra @8 | 15 August 2022 | 24 News HD

This story first appeared in www.thenews.com.pk

In a surprise move, the Chinese government opted to leave out Pakistan from a major global event on development – the High Level Dialogue on Global Development – that it was hosting. When questions were raised, several explanations came forth. From Pakistan’s official sources, the reason given was that it was a BRICS event and guests could have been invited only by consensus. Subsequently, the Foreign Office gave a public statement that one country, implying India, prevented China from inviting Pakistan. This was followed by an unrelated self-congratulatory statement that Pakistan was qualified to attend any global event on development.

Meanwhile, the Chinese response to the criticism came in the form of an answer to a question during the Chinese foreign ministry presser. Per the ministry spokesperson: “The decision to hold the High-Level Dialogue on Global Development was based on consultation among the BRICS countries.” What did this mean? This was a Chinese event based only on consultation among BRICS members. Clearly his Pakistani counterpart had said more: that it was a BRICS event. The spokesperson went on to make some laudatory statement for Pakistan, the usual talk about friendship between the two countries – that China and Pakistan “are all-weather strategic cooperative partners, that China highly values the important role of Pakistan in promoting global development” etc.

Both Islamabad and Beijing’s spokespersons had choreographed their response to the inevitable question: why not Pakistan? After all, about 14 non-BRICS countries – including Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan – had been invited.

In Pakistan, among unofficial circles, various explanations were put forward in responding to the question of China not inviting its key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The inevitable response to the news about Pakistan not having been invited was: how, by virtue of leading the BRI’s cornerstone megaproject CPEC, could Pakistan not be part of any Chinese-hosted high global development dialogue? Answers of course were coloured by political orientations. If you belonged to the PTI camp, the explanation was simple: naturally the Chinese were angry about ‘regime change’ and in protest did not invite the new government to participate. Straight and simple. PDM supporters insisted that China had been prevented by India from inviting Pakistan – since it was a BRICS event. And then there was a third group which felt that Pakistan had brought this upon itself by creating the internal mess that it is in today – that indeed a complaining China (regarding CPEC etc) would be justified in not inviting Pakistan. Based on the facts, none of these explanations is true.

Some facts now: this event was not a BRICS event. Having researched all the documentation on the event, it is clear that the event was held on the sidelines of BRICS. Since when are sideline events meant to get clearance from the organizers/members of the main event? Never. For example, when has an OIC event held on the sidelines of the UNGA be cleared by the UN secretary-general or by all UN Security Council members? Never.

Clearly, the High Level Dialogue was not a BRICS event. The Chinese spokesperson also only confirmed that the event was “based on consultations with BRICS members”; he did not clearly state it was a BRICS event. Significantly, after the BRICS summit which ended on June 24 a declaration was issued. Nowhere in the summit declaration was there any mention of the June 25 global dialogue as a BRICS event. It is indeed perplexing that the Pakistan FO spokesperson would say that before the event China explained the situation to Pakistan regarding one BRICS country blocking Pakistan’s participation.

If this is not a mere afterthought for damage limitation, then indeed a more serious question arises: how did Pakistan find the Chinese explanation that India had vetoed Pakistan participation in the event acceptable? Certainly this is a strange excuse coming from China – given that this was not a publicly labeled BRICS event and even more that China had multiple compelling reasons to insist upon Pakistan’s participation. Was Pakistan, in its extra cautiousness regarding US ‘sensitivity’ okay being left out of a Chinese event? Unlikely. Then how would Pakistan accept the Chinese explanation? Equally: how could India dissuade China from inviting its key strategic partner? This is not the Chinese way, and never has been especially within the Pakistan-China context.

All is not alright with the explanations given out by Islamabad and Beijing. Why then harp on about a development which does not materially impact the strategic Pakistan-China relationship? Simply because it raises several important questions. Three are specifically important. One: does China seek to signal publicly on issues that it should, as it always has, discuss privately. Two: what caused the surprising ‘moment of weakness’ for China to be persuaded by India on Pakistan’s participation? Is this newfound strategic unity on Ukraine and the Russian oil issue? The practical manifestation of this convergence is the mutually reinforcing act of buying excessive amounts of oil in the face of attempted global censure. Three: is there some misunderstanding in Beijing that, given the difficulties within Pakistan, the country will overlook being denied its rightful place at the high table convened by its strategic partner where countries with lesser stature and lesser relevance are present ? By virtue of the bilateral geo-security and geo-economic architecture that the two have constructed over the years, Pakistan remains an indispensable partner for China and vice-versa, which also translates into mutual respect and trust.

Clearly, the Pakistan-China friendship is indeed deep, and will always remain so. Strategic relations between the two countries remain, at varying degrees, the cornerstone of Pakistan and China’s national security policies. In the most testing times they have stood by each other. Last week, when India and the US jointly moved to list Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba’s deputy chief as a global terrorist under the UNSC 1267 Committee, China prevented this for at least six months by putting the matter on a “technical hold.” Pakistan meanwhile has remained steadfast about not joining the global criticism chorus regarding China, saying: “we don’t criticize friends in public, we discuss issues in private”. More recently, Pakistan did not attend US President Joe Biden’s Democracy summit primarily as a mark of solidarity with China.

While China has the right to raise substantive issues like implications for bilateral relations of the much talked about ‘reset’ of Pakistan relations with major powers, the slow progress on many CPEC projects, undermining security of Chinese personnel, so does Pakistan on issues like Gwadar-plus, the absence of a senior Chinese diplomat as ambassador to Pakistan, the IPPS etc. Constructive, closed-door dialogue will yield positive results. Missteps, however small, breach trust and mutual strategic faith – and must be avoided at all costs.

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