Foreign affairs – SAWM Sisters

Afghanistan and the Taliban: next stage in the Great Game

Suhasini Haidar — Sat, 23 Mar 2019 15:19:28 +0000

Defeatism will hurt India’s interests more than the Taliban’s return to Kabul could

As international talks with the Taliban leadership gain momentum, India’s foreign policy establishment has gone through the five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. After the initial denial that several countries, including the U.S., Russia, U.A.E., Qatar and Saudi Arabia, were engaging with Pakistan in order to bring senior Taliban leaders to the table in late 2017, India protested against being cut out of the talks. It then negotiated to join them, followed by expressions of deep misgiving over where the talks would lead. And finally this has given way to acceptance today that the talks have not only progressed, but are being given priority over every other process in Afghanistan.

Valid concerns

The misgivings are well placed, and confirmed by the results of the last round of talks between U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leaders in Doha (February 25-March 12). The talks appeared to be held on the Taliban’s terms, and at a venue of its choice. Therefore, while clear agreements have been forged on the withdrawal of foreign forces and on not allowing Afghan soil for use by foreign terror groups, agreements on a comprehensive ceasefire and an intra-Afghan dialogue, once considered the minimum “redlines” or starting point of engaging with the Taliban, have now been made the last priority.

These talks have also broken the most important redline, that of being led by, or at least held with the full backing and knowledge of, the democratically-led government in Kabul. This became evident a few days ago. During a visit to Washington on March 14, Afghan National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib lashed out at Mr. Khalilzad for “delegitimising” the Ashraf Ghani government by carrying out talks in the dark.

Another reason for New Delhi’s disquiet is that these talks continue without acknowledging a role for India, despite this being an expressly stated goal of Mr. Trump’s South Asia policy. This week, Mr. Khalilzad’s conference at the U.S. State Department to discuss “international support for the Afghan peace process, the role each party can play in bringing an end to the war, and progress to date in peace talks” included only special envoys from Russia, China and the European Union.

Finally, there is the uncertainty for Afghanistan’s future that these talks have wrought that worries India. When talks with the Taliban began, the objective was to try to mainstream the insurgents into the political process, and at least have a working ceasefire by the time presidential elections, scheduled for April 2019, were held. The reality is far from that. The Taliban continues to carry out terror attacks in Afghanistan even as its leadership talks with the U.S. Despite the Ministry of External Affairs issuing a statement on the importance of holding the presidential elections, the Afghan vote has been further postponed to September 28. This makes Mr. Ghani’s continuance more tenuous under the constitution, which could mean an interim government will be installed, something India has been opposed to as well.

New Delhi is worried about the prospect of chaos and civil war, akin to the scene after the previous U.S. pullout in the early 1990s that cut India out and brought the Taliban to power in Kabul with Pakistan’s support. Despite the restricted room for manoeuvre, however, there are several steps New Delhi can and must take in the present scenario to ensure both its own relevance in Afghanistan and stability in the region.

Talks with Taliban

To begin with, there is the question of talks with the Taliban, which India has thus far refused. In the recent past, the Modi government has shown some flexibility on the issue, by sending a “non-official” representation to the Moscow talks with the Taliban. After a visit to Delhi in January by Mr. Khalilzad, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat even suggested that India should “jump on the bandwagon” of engaging the Taliban.

However, direct, open talks between India and the Taliban at this point would serve little purpose for either side. For India, it would mean casting aside a consistently held moral principle and speaking to a non-state actor that espouses terrorism. While backchannel talks between intelligence agencies and the Taliban have been conducted for years, recognising the Taliban as a legitimate interlocutor for India at this point would be a betrayal of India’s values without any visible gains. India’s policy for the past two decades is to deal with the government in Kabul, and this will hold it in good stead if the Taliban were to eventually be a part of the government there.

The truth is, 2019 is not 1989, and much has changed inside Afghanistan as it has in the world outside. While Afghan security forces have suffered many losses in the past year, it is unlikely that the Taliban would today be able to overrun and hold Kabul or any other big Afghan city as it did before. It also seems inconceivable that a “full withdrawal” of U.S. troops will include giving up all the bases they hold at present. Given technology, social media and the progress in education in Afghanistan since 2001 (the number of secondary graduates rose from 10,000 to more than 300,000 in 2015), it is also unlikely that the Taliban will be able to control the hearts and minds of Afghans if it were to revert to its brutal ways. Nor could it run policies that endanger Indian interests in the country, given the special place India enjoys, amongst thousands of Afghans who have studied in India, youth and women supported by Indian development projects, and hundreds of military officers trained in the country.

Every one of the 17 presidential tickets announced also has an “India-friendly” face on it, and India must leverage its influence across the spectrum. With presidential elections put off for the moment, India could work with these Afghan leaders to support a ‘Grand Jirga’ that ensures that the maximum number of representatives from across Afghanistan articulate their post-reconciliation vision.

India is also host to a sizeable population of Afghans who live, work and study in the country, and an outreach is important. After all, when the Vladimir Putin government brought Taliban representatives and Afghan leaders to the table for the ‘Moscow process’, it was under the aegis of an association of Afghans resident in Russia. It was public support for talks with the Taliban that gave the reconciliation process legitimacy, and it is necessary that public opinion on issues like democracy, women’s rights, education and the media also be allowed to hold sway. The world must see Afghans as they see themselves, and not according to the often-skewed ideas generated at conferences on Afghanistan’s future that sometimes don’t even include an Afghan representation.

Finally, both India and Pakistan have a shared responsibility in building a dialogue over Afghanistan post-reconciliation. It is necessary that officials on both sides find a way to sit across the table on Afghanistan some day.

Take the long view

Despite all the many reasons for despondency, it is necessary that Indian strategists don’t lose sight of the bigger picture — India’s longstanding relationship with the people of Afghanistan. This is a relationship nurtured by every government in New Delhi, with more than $3 billion invested by India since 2001, which has reaped manifold returns in terms of goodwill and friendship across Afghanistan. Defeatism or a lack of ambition for the India-Afghanistan relationship at this juncture would be much more detrimental to India’s interests than anything the Taliban’s return to Afghanistan’s political centrestage can do.

source: The Hindu

Indian analysts worry about advantage Pakistan as US-Afghanistan ties hit new low

Jyoti Malhotra — Sat, 23 Mar 2019 15:13:48 +0000

Afghan National Security Adviser was summoned and pulled up by US after he accused its special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad of vested interests in the peace process.

New Delhi: US negotiations with the Taliban without official Afghan participation have led to the worst diplomatic spat in years between Kabul and Washington, and the rift has Indian analysts worried about its possible implications for South Asia.

Speaking to a gaggle of reporters in Washington last week, Afghan National Security Adviser (NSA) Hamdullah Mohib lashed out at US special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, describing him as a “viceroy”.

Kabul, Mohib said, believed the US’ talks with the Taliban were aimed at installing another interim government in Afghanistan, as happened after the terror group’s ouster in 2001, and accused Afghan-native Khalilzad of angling for the post of president in the administration that takes shape.

Khalilzad, he said, was cutting the Afghans out of the so-called peace talks between the US and the Taliban in Qatar because the Americans wanted to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

“We think either the ambassador doesn’t know what he is doing, or he has something else in mind,” Mohib said, according to American website Daily Beast.

“People in government think perhaps all this talk is to create a caretaker government, of which he will then become the viceroy,” Mohib added.

‘Left high & dry’

India’s top Afghan watchers have expressed concern at the fast-deteriorating relations between the US and Afghanistan, pointing out that Mohib’s national security budget was fully funded by the Americans.

“The faster this rupture is repaired, the better it is for the outcome of the war. Who do you think will be having the last laugh?” asked Amar Sinha, member of the National Security Advisory Board and former ambassador to Afghanistan, pointing to the benefits Pakistan could potentially rake in if the diplomatic spat continued.

An Indian ambassador to Afghanistan who knows Mohib well and spoke to ThePrint on the condition of anonymity pointed out that the Afghan leader was not given to speaking loosely.

“He has served a full term as Afghan’s ambassador to the US without any problem,” he said. “This kind of strong language would have to be sanctioned by the man on the top, none other than President Ashraf Ghani.”

Rakesh Sood, who served as India’s ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to early 2008, echoed the view.

“Mohib is reflecting the unhappiness of Afghanistan’s national unity government (NUG, an administration run by a coalition of all the power blocs in a country) as it feels it has been left high and dry in the (peace talks) process, which is supposed to be an intra-Afghan dialogue,” Sood added.

“To that extent, the fact that the Afghans are not involved only diminishes the legitimacy of the NUG.”

Mohib’s use of the word ‘viceroy’, a pejorative that connotes the arrogance of the British Raj and which South Asians understand all too well, as well as his other criticism had a swift impact.

“Mr Mohib’s comments are inaccurate and unhelpful, and we will be responding to them privately,” a US State Department spokesperson said.

Mohib was summoned and given a dressing-down at the US State Department by US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale, who also called Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and told him that the US administration would no longer deal with the NSA.

‘Spring in winter’

With Mohib essentially becoming a lame duck, it is unclear how the peace process will unfold from here.

Certainly, the Americans will hardly feel obliged to discuss the matter any further with the Afghans.

In a series of tweets on 12 March, after he concluded 16 days of talks with the Taliban in Qatar, Khalilzad said both sides had made progress on a “withdrawal timeline and effective counter-terrorism measures”.

On 16 March, he met Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and other dignitaries in Washington DC, noting that despite “a chill in the air, it feels like spring”.

Separate fact from fiction, the real from the fake going viral on social media, on HoaXposed .

source: The Print

India should soothe Trump’s feelings over ‘unfair’ trade practices, especially after Balakot

Jyoti Malhotra — Wed, 06 Mar 2019 13:07:26 +0000

Should New Delhi, at this delicate moment when it needs friends, antagonise one of its closest partners?

Barely had the dust settled on the India-Pakistan standoff last week, when US President Donald Trump announced that America would terminate India (and Turkey)’s status as beneficiary countries under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme.

Certainly, the timing is awful. Even if the GSP decision has long been in the making, and much of it is a decision by US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, the fact is that Trump’s announcement comes hot on the heels of the Americans brokering a deal with Pakistan to release Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman and return him home to India.

The US led from the front, along with France and Germany, to push for the return of the captured IAF pilot. In exchange, India would de-escalate and not retaliate against the Pakistan Air Force’s actions.

Within 60 hours of his capture, Abhinandan was home. Both India and Pakistan claimed victory – the former, because it had struck Pakistani territory outside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, within kissing distance of Islamabad and Rawalpindi; the latter, because it had achieved an element of surprise by breaching the LoC in broad daylight, shooting down an Indian MiG-21 and capturing an IAF pilot.

The weekend intervened and the world moved on. PM Narendra Modi returned to domestic politics, challenging anyone to go against the narrative on Pakistan spun by the BJP.

Then, out of the blue Tuesday morning, Trump announced India’s eviction from the GSP list. India tried to moderate the blow, saying it won’t really affect India’s exports. But the fact remains that the political signalling is terrible.

Apart from helping bring back Abhinandan, the US is leading the charge to ban Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar at the UN Security Council. The Chinese have clearly indicated they won’t play ball on that front.

Should New Delhi, at this delicate moment when it needs friends, antagonise one of its closest partners? It boggles the mind why the Modi government would not find a way to soothe Trump’s feelings on allegedly unfair trade and e-commerce decisions that promote domestic Indian companies over foreign ones.

At a time when it should be pulling out the red carpet and arranging roses, the Modi government is chastening an important partner and ally because of domestic Swadeshi Jagran Manch considerations.

The SJM has openly said that domestic industry is being swamped by e-retail American and Chinese giants and that they should be curbed.

Could there be another reason why Modi has not been attentive to Trump, still the most powerful leader in the world?

Speculation that both leaders hardly have a rapport has been rife for some time. The fact that they are alike in so many ways should have helped them get along better. But Trump and Modi seem to be growing farther and farther apart in recent months.

Trump’s fairly simple line of thinking is quite clear. His India decision indicates that he is, above all, interested in money matters. He personally ramped up the confrontation with the Chinese, because he believed Beijing was taking unfair advantage of US’ open trade policies, to the extent that both sides have now agreed that it is important to sit down and talk.

Like the Chinese, Modi definitely believes there is a Modi way of doing things – the recent strikes on Pakistan are proof. But with the Indian economy still so fragile after the upheaval of demonetisation, antagonising a good friend abroad who comes to your aid in a variety of other ways, may not be the best diplomacy.

Because of the US, Modi was able to tell his domestic audiences that he got Wing Commander Abhinandan back in rapid time; no other government, not even Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had been able to do this during Kargil. (At the time, Group Captain Kambampati Nachiketa, who was shot down by the Pakistanis, was returned only after eight days.)

Still, two lessons have emerged from the recent India-Pakistan crisis.

First, the Narendra Modi government will now milk the crisis for all its worth in the coming Lok Sabha elections. All those who ask legitimate questions of the government will be deemed anti-national. Union minister Piyush Goyal’s recent tirade against an India Today journalist is an example. It was even more surprising because the TV channel has been largely supportive of the government’s security and foreign policies.

The message to the media in the run up to the polls is clear: Either you are with us, or against us.

Second, the international community is so consumed with its own troubles that it has little patience for two poor nations with their fingers on the nuclear button. It largely agrees with PM Modi’s argument that Pakistan is a recalcitrant state and uses both nuclear weapons as well as terrorism in the most toxic of ways to achieve its goals. It will largely leave Modi to deal how he likes with Pakistan.

But it will not hesitate to intervene if things reach a flashpoint.

Now that the crisis is over, the US has returned to talks with the Taliban, the British are back to being consumed by their impending departure from the European Union, the National People’s Congress in Beijing is on course and the OIC has carved out a middle path by asking India and Pakistan to settle Kashmir.

Notice, though, South African comedian Trevor Noah’s recent comments that war between the two neighbours would be “most entertaining”, as he moved his torso to Bollywood music on his show.

Although Noah has since apologised for his remarks, his comments are an indication of the belief that India-Pakistan leaders are still so childish they don’t understand adult, big-picture concerns about war.

One thing is for sure. After last week’s strikes, the detested hyphenation that India took such pains and so many years to get rid of, with its western neighbour, is back.

source: The Print

Exclusive: Inside details of Pakistan’s diplomatic failure at OIC

Geeta Mohan — Mon, 04 Mar 2019 07:00:46 +0000

The first protest happened during the second session when the Pakistani delegation led by Raja Ali Ejaz, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, argued with the OIC for extending invitation to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj as the guest of honour.

HIGHLIGHTS

At OIC, Pakistan failed in getting Kashmir included in the final joint communique
Pakistan did not attend the OIC meeting over special honour to Sushma Swaraj
Pakistan tried its best to get OIC to withdraw its invitation to India but to no avail

Pakistan may have won the battle at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) but, India has won the war. While Pakistan claimed victory for getting a separate resolution on Kashmir passed by the OIC, it failed in getting Kashmir included in the final joint communique, the Abu Dhabi Declaration.

The joint declaration or the final draft is the only document that the host (UAE) drafts and presents for discussion. It is the only document which is adopted by all the 57 member nations at the OIC.

Despite numerous assertions, the forum and the host country did not give in to Pakistan’s demands to include Kashmir in the final draft.

India Today TV has learnt through sources privy to the goings on at the conference that Pakistan used the forum to protest in every session on various issues related to India. The first protest happened during the second session when the Pakistani delegation led by Raja Ali Ejaz, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, argued with the OIC for extending invitation to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj as the guest of honour.

An official present in the meeting said, “They made their displeasure abundantly clear during the second session of the first day [March 1], blasting the OIC for inviting India. They were referring to some resolution in their Parliament.”

Pakistan, on Friday (March 1), had announced that it will not attend the 46th session of the OIC’s Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Abu Dhabi.

During the joint session of Parliament in Pakistan, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said, “A joint resolution has been passed by Parliament, signed by all parties, which demands that Pakistan refrain from attending the OIC meeting. In light of this resolution, I will not attend the meeting.”

That was the first diplomatic win for India.

Pakistan tried its best to get OIC to withdraw its invitation to India but to no avail. Pakistan did not just protest at the forum, the country’s delegation reached out to the UAE and Saudi Arabia and even called for an emergency meeting of the OIC “Contact Group on J&K” in Jeddah on February 27 to get the invitation withdrawn.

Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua and President of AJK or “Azad Kashmir” Masood Khan were also present in the emergency meeting. Their argument was the alleged human rights violations against Kashmiris and minorities in India.

While they tried to make a strong case on why India should not be invited, but the arguments failed to convince the host.

Sushma Swaraj was invited by her UAE counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Sources tell India Today TV that Pakistan was conveyed that there will be no change in the decision to “invite” India. Pakistan was also informed that Sushma Swaraj would be “welcomed with full honour” accorded to a guest.

Despite its insurmountable pressure on all the Islamic nations, the second and bigger blow came when Pakistan could not get ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ mentioned in the joint declaration of the 46th session of OIC.

The Abu Dhabi Declaration has no mention, not even a passing reference, of Jammu and Kashmir. Much diplomatic effort was put in by India to ensure that it is kept out of the joint communique.

Sources say that UAE and Saudi Arabia had a very important role to play in ensuring the “guest” is not “embarrassed”.

The Pakistani delegation was also seen engaged in serious conversations with various foreign ministers, particularly the Saudi foreign minister. However, their efforts could only get them success in separate resolutions on Kashmir, India-Pakistan peace process, the recent air space violations, minorities’ situation in India and destruction of religious place.

An official explained, “The resolutions don’t reflect or need a consensus. They are essentially national positions of individual countries. Many countries move resolutions of their own interest, most go unopposed.”

The last session of the last day (March 2) was a clincher for India. The session to adopt the final document, the Abu Dhabi Declaration, witnessed some hysterical scenes.

When the joint declaration was to be adopted, there were only two countries that stood in protest. Iran and Pakistan. Iran protested the paragraph which spoke of “Iranian occupation of three Emirati islands”, calling the process undemocratic and unfair.

Sources confirmed to India Today TV that the Pakistani delegation was unhappy about the lack of opportunity to get their views into the Abu Dhabi Declaration. So, while Pakistan has been calling its diplomatic maneuverings a grand success, it is India, an outsider, that won the day.

In the history of all the “joint declarations” at the OIC, the 2016 Tashkent Declaration was the only time when Kashmir was omitted from the final document.

source: India Today

Watch | Imran’s Appeal: Can India, Pakistan Stop the Drift to War?

Arfa Khanum — Fri, 01 Mar 2019 15:40:45 +0000

Arfa Khanum Sherwani, senior editor at The Wire, discusses what happened in the 24 hours after India’s airstrikes on Pakistan.

New Delhi: After India officially confirmed that one Indian pilot is “missing in action” after an aerial skirmish with Pakistani fighter jets on Wednesday, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan called for “better sense [to] prevail” and renewed his offer for dialogue with India.

source: The Wire

Abhinandan Varthaman release: World leaders work behind the scenes to avert India-Pakistan conflict

Suhasini Haidar — Fri, 01 Mar 2019 07:31:55 +0000

U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE may have been behind Pakistan’s decision to announce the release of Abhinandan Varthaman.

A series of visits, phone calls and backroom diplomacy by the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE may have been behind Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision to announce the unilateral release of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, a move that appears to have averted an escalation in the situation between India and Pakistan for the moment.

In addition to the announcement, the statement by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi that they will study the dossier on Jaish-e-Mohammad’s link to the Pulwama bombing, as well as the listing request of JeM chief Masood Azhar which was filed late on Wednesday night by the U.S., U.K. and France at the U.N. Security Council had the desired effect on New Delhi, sources told The Hindu.

Trump’s announcement

While Pakistan maintains its decision was purely a “gesture of goodwill and peace,” and India rejected any “third party mediation” in ties with Pakistan, the first hint of an outside player came from U.S. President Donald Trump.

“[India and Pakistan] have been going at it, and we have been involved in trying to have them stop, and I think we will have some reasonably decent news, hopefully its going to be coming to an end… we have been trying to get them both some help, get some organisation and peace….” Mr. Trump, who was in Hanoi, said on Thursday around noon in India, hours before Mr. Khan’s announcement

In Delhi, the government appeared surprised by Mr. Trump’s words. Sources said that India and Pakistan have several channels of communication should they wish to use them, and don’t need third parties to come in. The sources blamed a ‘war psychosis’ whipped up by Pakistan on Wednesday, with its officials warning the international community of a “massive Indian missile strike” in response to the Wednesday attacks by Pakistan, despite the government making it clear it would not escalate the situation.

By evening, rumours and comments had gripped many world capitals, sufficiently alarmed by the build up in Pakistan, which included the shut down of Pakistani airspace, a full “red alert” for hospitals in the country, and raised security at Karachi port. Overnight, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who was also in Hanoi, called National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and discussed escalating tensions.

Saudi intervention

Meanwhile Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir announced a visit to Islamabad with an “important message.” And in Delhi, Saudi Ambassador Saud Al-Sati met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammad Bin Zayed (MbZ) spoke to Mr. Modi and Mr. Khan from Singapore. In a rare public comment on twitter, MbZ said he spoke to both of the “importance of dealing wisely with recent developments and giving priority to dialogue and communication.”

Diplomats said that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, who visited both countries last week, and the Crown Prince of UAE had a keen interest in the situation. “Given the huge investment from UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Indian and Pakistani economies, these two countries that are both close to the Gulf region will not be allowed to go to war,” a diplomatic source told The Hindu.

On Friday, both External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Pakistan’s Mr. Qureshi will be in Abu Dhabi for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting. But officials say they are not expected to meet as Mr. Qureshi is boycotting the inaugural plenary that Ms. Swaraj will address, and she will leave UAE shortly after her speech.

source: The Hindu

Coalition of the concerned

Suhasini Haidar — Fri, 01 Mar 2019 07:07:56 +0000

Multi-pronged diplomacy is vital to compel Pakistan to end its support for terrorist groups

In the wake of the Pulwama attack on February 14, the government has iterated once again its plan for the “diplomatic isolation” of Pakistan. The idea, which was first articulated after the 2016 Uri attacks, is a non-starter, as was underlined by the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman to both countries earlier this month, just a few days after Pulwama. In Pakistan, the Prince called himself “Pakistan’s Ambassador” in his country, and issued a joint statement praising Pakistan for its fight against terrorism. Clearly, a more considered diplomatic strategy, less full of rhetoric, must be chalked out by the government in response to cross-border terrorism.

Beyond isolation

To begin with, the government would do better to repackage its idea of “isolating Pakistan” into one of building a more inclusive ‘coalition against terrorism emanating from Pakistan’. In the past couple of weeks alone, Iran and Afghanistan have faced terror attacks on their security forces along the border with Pakistan — and several other countries, which have also faced such attacks or see the presence of Pakistan-based groups on their soil, would be willing to join ranks on this. The truth is, in today’s interconnected world, it is vainglorious to expect countries to join a unilateral plan for isolation.

Despite the U.S.’s considerable might, it has been unable to get most countries, including India, to sever ties with Iran and North Korea, for example. The impact of such a campaign is also doubtful: after years of trying to isolate North Korea, the U.S. is pursuing talks with its leader. While isolation might work as a campaign slogan for domestic audiences, it is quickly rebuffed each time a country engages with the nation one is trying to isolate. An inclusive coalition is more likely to move nations at the global stage as well. The success of the efforts led by the U.S. and other countries to ‘grey list’ Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force or of French efforts for a United Nations Security Council statement on Pulwama points to that.

Second, India must focus on the case against Masood Azhar, which pre-dates the case against 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed. In a first, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for the Pulwama attack in a suicide bomber video that has not thus far been disputed by its leader Masood Azhar. Azhar has been on the U.S.’s radar since 1992, when he was a leader of the banned terror group Harkat ul-Ansar, and worked with jihadi groups in Sudan and Bangladesh. His release after years in Indian prisons in exchange for hostages on board the IC-814 flight should on its own merit his banning and prosecution — not just in Pakistan, but in all the countries whose nationals were on board that Indian Airlines flight, as well as the stops that flight made: in Nepal, the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan.

Third, India must prepare for a pushback from Pakistan, most likely in terms of internationalising the Kashmir issue, and linking it to progress in Afghanistan. This is what Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zahid Nasrullah, did when he said that any attack by India would “impact the momentum” of the peace talks in Afghanistan. His words were heard beyond Kabul, in Washington and Moscow. On February 18, members of the Taliban negotiating team were due to meet U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in Islamabad. The talks were called off after Afghanistan objected to the Taliban team’s travel to Pakistan, and rescheduled for February 25 in Doha. It remains to be seen how much countries trying to negotiate with the Taliban will need Pakistan’s leverage to make progress on those talks. U.S. President Donald Trump sees them as the precursor for plans to pull out most troops in combat in Afghanistan before his re-election bid for 2020.

The American angle

Next, the government must prioritise action over words, when it comes to moves against Pakistan’s sponsorship and hosting of the JeM. The measures taken thus far — cancelling Most Favoured Nation status, maximising use of Indus waters, denying visas to Pakistani sportspersons, etc. — have little real impact on Pakistan and certainly none on the military establishment. Instead of priding itself on extracting statements of condemnation from various governments in the world, it is better for New Delhi to use India’s considerable diplomatic leverage to ensure action that would shut down the JeM and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) permanently and bring their leaders to justice. In this regard, mere statements and bans have not worked for more than two decades, and the government must consider other options, especially with the countries that carry the most leverage and access in Pakistan: China, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

It is puzzling that the U.S. has been able to carry out drone strikes on a whole host of terror group leaders on Pakistan’s western front, but never once targeted camps and infrastructure belonging to the JeM and the LeT, despite their well-established links to al-Qaeda. India must also press the U.S. to place travel sanctions on specific entities in the Pakistani military establishment unless visible action is taken against the JeM, whose leaders hold public rallies and issue videos threatening India.

Contrary to popular perception, the Trump administration’s moves to cancel funds to Pakistan last year is not the toughest action the U.S. has contemplated: in May 1992, then U.S. President George H.W Bush had directed his Secretary of State James Baker to send a stern letter to then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif threatening to designate Pakistan as a “State sponsor of Terror” for its support to Kashmiri and Sikh militant groups.

A similar line of talks must be pursued by New Delhi with Riyadh — which once was a donor to Pakistan’s Islamist institutions, but now is wary of funding extremism — to withhold any funds that may trickle down to charitable wings run by the JeM and LeT. With China, it is surprising that the issue of a simple ban at the UN Security Council has not been made India’s chief demand from Beijing. It is hoped that this will be rectified soon when the next proposal to ban Azhar is brought to the UNSC, and during Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to China this week for the trilateral Russia-India-China meeting. More than the ban, however, India must ask China for action against any entities dealing with the JeM in Pakistan, given that China is the partner with the most influence in Pakistan today, and one with the most to lose from terror groups in Punjab operating along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Steady dialogue

Finally, India must look to its own actions on the diplomatic front with Pakistan. Calling off a formal dialogue process for more than a decade has clearly yielded no desired outcome. South Asia as a region, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) process too have suffered the consequences of this disengagement, without yielding any desired outcomes. A measured, steady and non-political level of dialogue is a more effective way of impressing India’s determination to root out terrorism than the present on-again, off-again policy. As the nation prepares for a possible military response to the Pulwama attack, it is important that New Delhi consider its diplomatic response carefully, particularly taking into account both the historical and regional context of its moves.

source: The Hindu

UAE’s invite to speak at OIC reaffirms Narendra Modi’s turn to the Gulf

Jyoti Malhotra — Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:47:13 +0000

Overhaul of the Islamic world vis-a-vis India will take some time, but as long as MBZ and Modi are concerned, the journey has begun.

hen the BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha came to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nayhan in 2017, asking permission to build a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi, they brought two designs with them. The first was a box-like structure with a recessed temple, like the one in New Jersey, US, while the other was a regular temple with a ‘shikhara’, like the one in London, UK.

Diplomatic sources said Mohammed bin Zayed, or MBZ as he is popularly known, pointed out that if a temple had to be built in the UAE, it should have all the trappings. So the UAE ruler gave permission to build a temple that looked like one, the sources said, as well as donated 55,000 square metres of land for the complex, for which Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation stone last year.

The same MBZ has now pushed for India to be the “guest of honour” at the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), a gathering of 57 states that represents the Islamic world. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj will speak at the plenary on March 1 in Abu Dhabi and then return home, as India is neither a member nor an observer, despite having the third largest Muslim population in the world.

At the OIC plenary, Sushma Swaraj is bound to run into her Pakistani counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, even as India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads since the Pulwama terror attack in which 44 CRPF jawans were killed.

Certainly, the invitation to India is significant. It comes 50 years after the OIC invited India’s Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to attend the conference in Rabat, Morocco, as a member, only to withdraw the invite after Pakistan’s Yahya Khan objected.

Yahya used the Ahmedabad riots that had just taken place and in which more than 600 Muslims were killed, to deny India the opportunity. India could not be trusted with its Muslim population, he had then said. The OIC had no option but to fall in line.

Today’s OIC, and especially the UAE’s MBZ who has issued the invite and with whom Prime Minister Narendra Modi has formed a special relationship, is a totally different country.

The Indian working population in the UAE is about 3.3 million, one-third of its total population. The UAE has promised a $75 billion fund for infrastructure development and promised to participate in India’s strategic oil reserve in Mangalore. Alleged fraudsters like Rajiv Saxena, who recently got bail, and middlemen Christian Michel in the AgustaWestland case have been extradited by the UAE to India. MBZ has visited India four times since Modi came to power, including as chief guest for the Republic Day in 2017.

There is absolutely no doubt that India’s pivot to the Gulf is underpinned by the UAE, which in turn is underlined by the special relationship between Modi and MBZ.

Here’s more: Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, considers the Emirati MBZ as “something of a mentor,” sources said. It is hardly a coincidence that when MBS flew back to Riyadh from Pakistan last week after being wooed by Prime Minister Imran Khan, he broke journey in Abu Dhabi en route to Delhi for his visit.

With MBZ investing so heavily in the relationship with India, it is clear that the emergency OIC meeting called by Pakistan Tuesday to discuss the Jammu and Kashmir issue is likely to fall flat. Moreover, the OIC communiqué at the end of the March 1-2 meeting is unlikely to have any critical remarks about India.

The UAE sheikh certainly isn’t inviting India to the OIC meeting one day and then proceeding to insult her the next. It is almost certain that the Saudi prince was last week carrying a message from Pakistan to India, to open talks and not avenge the CRPF killings.

Meanwhile, the US has moved a proposal in the UN Security Council to ban Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar, which could take up to a couple of weeks. The world’s big powers are hoping that diplomacy will prevail and that China will fall in line.

None of this means that the UAE and Saudi Arabia – which, along with Pakistan, were the only three countries in the world to recognise the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s – have ended their relationship with Pakistan. Late last year, the Saudis gave Imran Khan $6 billion in aid, while the UAE gave $3 billion. MBS promised he would invest another $20 billion when he went to Pakistan last week.

One way of looking at India’s expanded diplomatic presence is that as long as Delhi and the world continue to jaw-jaw, the chances of war-war are reduced.

But in the dry, desert wind blowing across the Gulf, something is changing. And from all accounts, MBZ is leading that change.

Certainly, the Abu Dhabi ruler seems like a colourful character. In the wake of 9/11, the anecdote in Abu Dhabi goes, MBZ’s father, the senior Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nayhan, asked him if he (MBZ) would go to Afghanistan to fight on behalf of Muslims and against America. When MBZ expressed shock and horror, the father pointed out that just “because they are not true Muslims”, don’t be afraid to engage in battle.

MBZ, of course, didn’t go to war in Afghanistan, but he never forgot. Ever since, he is said to be obsessed with the idea of Islam being hijacked by extremist Muslims. He is also said to want a way out of the conundrum which keeps India out of the OIC despite its 185 million Muslim population – even Russia has observer status.

The invitation to Sushma Swaraj to speak is a first step. It is also a signal to the Pakistani establishment that the rest of the Muslim world doesn’t approve of the terrorist organisations on its soil.

The overhaul of the Islamic world vis-a-vis India, courtesy the OIC, will take a long time, but as long as MBZ and Modi are concerned, the journey has begun.

source: The Print

India moves to quickly mount diplomatic campaign against Pakistan at UN, FATF

Jyoti Malhotra — Sat, 16 Feb 2019 13:05:51 +0000

India is seeking support of P-5 countries to ban JeM chief Masood Azhar & is looking to keep Pakistan on FATF’s ‘grey list’.

New Delhi: With pressure rising on the Modi government to take visible action after the Pulwama attack, India will mount a diplomatic campaign at the United Nations as early as Monday to ban Masood Azhar, the chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) which carried out the attack against CRPF personnel in Kashmir.

India will also impress upon the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), meeting in Paris Monday, that Pakistan should not be taken off its “grey list”.

In keeping with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s comments in Jhansi Friday that Pakistan had been reduced to “taking its begging bowl” to the world, New Delhi is likely to request the big powers to tighten economic aid and loans to Pakistan until it ends terror, said sources.

New Delhi believes the economic route to stifle Pakistan could reap much richer dividends than anything else. The withdrawal of India’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status to Pakistan, while a small measure, is a clear indication in this regard.

P-5 route

In separate meetings with all the ambassadors of the Permanent-5 countries in the UN Security Council (UNSC) Friday, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale pointed out that in the light of the JeM taking responsibility for the Pulwama attack in which 40 CRPF personnel were killed, India was readying to immediately move the 1267 Committee of the UNSC to proscribe Masood Azhar.

Gokhale also spoke to all the high commissioners from South Asia and the Persian Gulf region.

The 1267 committee is a technical committee which looks at individuals and organisations that member countries want to take action against.

While India is no longer a non-permanent member of the UNSC, it could request for the proscription of Masood Azhar as has been done thrice in the past.

On all three occasions, all the P-5 countries, save for China, had supported the ban against Azhar.

Sharing some of the proof that India had collected against the JeM, which is headquartered in Bahawalpur, Pakistan, Gokhale asked the ambassadors for their support.

The foreign secretary pointed out that the JeM had already been proscribed by the UN but that its chief, Masood Azhar, had not.

Diplomats from three P-5 countries who spoke to ThePrint on the condition of anonymity said the ambassadors said they would be supportive of India.

The Russian ambassador is believed to have said that India “as a sovereign country, had the right to protect itself”.

FATF mission

Simultaneously, New Delhi will mount a big campaign in Paris Monday to ensure that Pakistan is not taken off the “grey list” which seeks to impose strictures on countries who do not take action to curb terror financing.

Pakistan had been hopeful of going to the February FATF meeting saying it was abiding by the conditions imposed on it. But with JeM taking responsibility for the Pulwama attack, Indian sources said they would point out that this had not happened.

Meanwhile, New Delhi is also said to be in talks with the US to request it to look at Pakistani appeals for loans at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund with a much sterner eye.

source: The Print

How Modi speaks a different language with Pakistan than what Vajpayee did

Jyoti Malhotra — Sat, 16 Feb 2019 07:21:13 +0000

PM Modi’s ‘munh tod jawab’ stance over Pulwama attack is more abrasive than Vajpayee’s vow of ‘pratikar’ post-Kaluchak in 2002.

In his book ‘A Call to Honour’, former external affairs minister Jaswant Singh wrote that the May 2002 suicide terrorist attack in Kaluchak in the Jammu region, in which 30 people, including civilians were killed, “was the last straw” that almost brought India and Pakistan to war.

Only six months before, on December 13, 2001, terrorists had attacked Parliament, which led then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to launch ‘Operation Parakram,’ when several divisions of the army moved to the Pakistan border.

Seventeen years later, on 14 February 2019, a terrorist attack by the Jaish-e-Mohammed has killed at least 37 CRPF jawans, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised a “munh tod jawab (smash your face response)”.

The PM’s strong words in two public meetings the day after the attack in Pulwama, when he flagged off the Vande Bharat Express in New Delhi and then flew to Jhansi in Uttar Pradesh to inaugurate several projects worth Rs 20,000 crores, have escaped no one.

Although he cancelled his Friday’s political rally in Madhya Pradesh’s Itarsi as well as two others scheduled for Saturday (in Pandharkawada and Dhule), Modi did speak his mind fully in Delhi and in Jhansi:

— Security forces have been given the full freedom to decide how to respond to this dastardly attack, at a time and place of their choosing.

— Our neighbouring country is forgetting that this India is a new country (“nayi reeti and nayi neeti vaala Bharat”). Those who carried out this attack will be punished.

— Our neighbouring country finds it difficult to carry out their daily expenditure. They are roaming around the world with a begging bowl. By attacking us in Pulwama, they want to reduce us as well to this position. But we will not let this happen, we will smash their face with our response.

Modi has not left it to anybody’s imagination as to what is being contemplated. There is expected to be retaliation against Pakistan, at a time and place of India’s choosing.

Compare Modi’s remarks with those of the previous BJP prime minister Vajpayee’s.

In 2002, Vajpayee told Parliament, “Hamein pratikar karna hoga (we will have to retaliate).” On the whole, though, public rhetoric was kept low – unlike Modi, who twice in a day, has signalled his intention to punish Pakistan. Vajpayee had threatened to go to war against Pakistan, telling the Americans privately that he would do so if Pervez Musharraf was not called to heel.

It is worth recalling that Vajpayee’s reaction to Kaluchak came in the backdrop of his experience of the 1999 Kargil conflict – which he had skilfully managed by getting then US president Bill Clinton to ask Pakistani forces to withdraw to the Line of Control – as well as the failed talks in Agra in 2001.

The Americans, nervous that two nuclear neighbours would reach a flashpoint, pressed all their Western allies and Japan to take action. All diplomats and families in all the embassies and consulates in both India and Pakistan were withdrawn. Vajpayee wrote to the heads of government of all five permanent member countries that Musharraf had failed to live up to his promises to end cross-border infiltration.

But as Modi points out today, he is made of sterner stuff and India of 2019 is “a different country”. Over the next few days, Modi will lead from the front, unlike Vajpayee who left much of the backroom follow-up to his colleagues, whether it’s then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, then finance minister Yashwant Sinha or then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra.

The ministry of external affairs has already launched its diplomatic campaign to put global pressure on Pakistan. On February 17, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will begin a five-day meets in Paris to assess, in its first review, whether Pakistan has done enough to end terror financing.

Writing in the ‘New Yorker,’ journalist Steve Coll had noted that in 2002, after Kaluchak attack, Brajesh Mishra had told him that “We almost went in,” indicating that India had planned to invade Pakistan. “(B)ut Prime Minister Vajpayee, when he faced the final step, concluded that, at the end of a long political career, he wanted to be remembered as a man of peace,” Coll wrote.

Sure enough, a year later, Vajpayee travelled to Srinagar in the spring of 2013 and extended a hand for talks and friendship with its people.

Will Modi follow in Vajpayee’s footsteps? When the history pages are written, will Modi be remembered as a man of peace or war?

Read Global Pulse for a sampler of the big international stories, and why they matter.

source: The Print